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Climbing Mount Mitigation:  A Proposal for 







To me, the only way you achieve a summit is to come back alive.  The job 
is half done if you don't get down again.
2
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 * Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University College of 
Law, Tallahassee, Florida. I am thankful to the Washington & Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment for inviting me to participate in Symposium 2009:  Climate Policy Advice 
for the Obama Administration at the Washington & Lee School of Law, to participants at the 
conference for direct feedback on my presentation of the concepts outlined herein, and to Robin 
Kundis Craig, David Markell, and Jim Salzman for helpful comments on early draft 
manuscripts. Please direct any questions or comments to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.  
 1. In March 1923, in an interview with The New York Times, the British mountaineer 
George Leigh Mallory gave this response when asked why he wanted to climb Mount Everest, 
which no person had successfully accomplished. The answer became famous, particularly after 
Mallory and his fellow climber Andrew Irvine were lost on Everest in the following year. It was 
unclear whether they perished on the way up to or down from the summit. See Interview, 
Climbing Mount Everest is Work for Supermen, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1923, at X11, 
available at http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/mallory?view=uk 
(last visited November 5, 2009). 
 2. In May 1999, Mallory’s body was found on Everest, reigniting the question of 
whether or not he or Irvine had reached the summit 29 years before Sir Edmund Hillary's 
successful climb.  Mallory's son, John Mallory, offered this objective view of the implications of 
the finding of his father’s body. See AskOxford.com, A Quote from George Leigh Mallory, 
http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/ mallory/?view=uk (last visited 
November 5, 2009). 
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I. Introduction 
What is the United States’ climate change policy?  Nobody knows.  To be 
sure, there is plenty of talk and even some action, the latter mostly by states 
with the federal government moving slowly behind,3 but there could be no 
plausible claim that the United States, and by this I mean federal, state, local, 
tribal, and private actors from top to bottom—has formulated anything 
approaching a coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national climate change 
policy.4  
Formulating such a policy, even with what appears to be new-found 
political will at all governance levels, will be no mean feat.  Critical and as yet 
unanswered questions are most pressing at the federal scale:  How will U.S. 
policy interface with international and other national regimes? What form 
should comprehensive federal legislation take—cap and trade, carbon taxes, 
regulation, subsidies, something else? Should federal initiatives promote or 
preempt state and local climate change policies?  All these questions, however, 
focus on federal policy initiatives taken through new laws and new regulations 
implementing them.  
This Article focuses on a different but related fundamental policy design 
question:  How should federal agencies implement existing statutory authorities 
to contribute to a coherent national climate change policy?  One might ask why 
we should be concerned with how existing laws can be employed given 
reasonable expectations that the Obama Administration and Congress are 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Patrick A. Parenteau, Lead Follow or Get Out of the Way:  The States Tackle 
Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, (July 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1438180  (surveying the efforts of various states on 
climate change). 
 4. See Geoffrey Clemm & Mark Griffin Smith, Emerging U.S. Climate Change Policy:  
Where We are and How We Got Here, (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440339 (surveying the history and current landscape of national 
climate change policy). 
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poised to make gains on new federal initiatives.  For several reasons, however, 
it is unlikely that even bold new federal legislation—a comprehensive carbon 
tax on all fossil fuel consumption or a cap-and-trade program broadly 
encompassing major emission sources—will obviate the need to solve the 
puzzle of how to integrate existing laws into the picture.  First, it is unlikely 
that new federal legislation aimed at reducing national greenhouse gas 
emissions will alone allow us to meet our nation’s appropriate share (whatever 
that is) of global reductions necessary to wrestle climate change under control 
(whatever that level is).  Second, regardless of how aggressively the federal 
government regulates greenhouse gas emissions through some new legislative 
program, the global climate system will face a period of “committed warming” 
resulting from the buildup of past emissions in the troposphere.5  In short, 
something more than new federal emission reduction programs will be needed 
to reduce emissions (known as mitigation), and something entirely different 
from emission reduction programs will be needed to respond to the climate 
change we inevitably will experience regardless of mitigation success (known 
as adaptation).6 
As we look around for that something more, new state and local policy 
initiatives  surely come to mind as ways to fill the gap, but why not also turn to 
existing federal environmental and other legislation? Of course, for close to a 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference 
with the Climate System:  Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 105, 14245 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4oC even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible 
Climate Change due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 1704 
(2009) (estimating a 1000-year committed warming effect); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 19, 
Cambridge University Press, (April 2–5, 2007); available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (“Past emissions are estimated to involve some unavoidable 
warming . . . even if atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels.”); 
Professor Eric Biber has provided an in-depth examination of this lag effect and the resistance it 
is likely to generate against costly policy measures that may take decades to produce results. See 
Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009) ().  
 6.  Broadly speaking, in the language of climate change policy mitigation means polices 
designed to arrest climate change and adaptation means policies designed to deal with the 
climate change we either do not or cannot mitigate. See generally, Robin Kundis Craig, Climate 
Change Comes to the Clean Water Act:  Now What? (discussing the terms mitigation and 
adaptation in terms of the distinct policy needs and approaches of each); see also Robin Kundis 
Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” – Long Live Transformation:  Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/=1357766 (outlining general guidelines for formulating adaptation 
strategies).  
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decade some federal agencies, many interest groups, and a growing number of 
legal academics have been doing just that, but not in any systematic way.  Our 
federal “policy” for how to employ existing legislative authorities such as the 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National 
Environmental Policy Act to combat and respond to climate change has been 
shaped primarily by ad hoc agency policy studies, scatter-shot interest group 
litigation aimed at forcing agencies to do something or to prevent them from 
doing anything, and all variety of proposals in legal scholarship, which is to say 
there is no policy at all.  It is thus little surprise that the EPA Office of Inspector 
General recently found that “EPA does not have an overall plan to ensure 
developing consistent, compatible climate change strategies across the 
Agency.”7  I leave it to others to assign blame for that lack of cohesive federal 
policy initiatives on climate change to date.  The Obama Administration 
presents opportunities for a fresh start, and my aim here is to put existing 
federal regulatory programs at the heart of any effort the Administration 
activates to forge a comprehensive national climate change policy.  
Three overarching concerns strike me as complicating and constraining the 
role of existing authorities in that regard.  First, at least for the foreseeable 
future agencies most likely will have to rely on existing legislation as currently 
in place to define the scope of authority. Congress is unlikely soon in any 
systematic and comprehensive way to “update” existing legislation to take 
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals into account.  For one thing, the 
political game in Congress on climate change for now, if there is one, is about 
enacting new comprehensive emission reduction legislation.  But even with that 
task eventually behind it, Congress is likely to take up the Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in Massachusetts v. EPA8 that existing legislation can be sufficiently 
                                                                                                                 
 7. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 09-P-0089, EPA 
NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PLAN AND POLICIES TO FULFILL ITS EMERGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE ROLE, AT A GLANCE (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/20090202-09-P-0089.pdf.  
 8.  Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had erred in denying a citizen rulemaking 
petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles as an air pollutant under the 
Clean Air Act).  See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (defining “air pollutant” in 
sweeping terms to include “any air pollution agent . . . including any physical, chemical [or] 
biological . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”).  
The EPA dismissed the petition on the broad basis that global climate change is so complicated 
either Congress did not provide for greenhouse gas emissions to be subject matter for the Clean 
Air Act or, if Congress did so provide, the agency properly identified conflicting policy 
concerns as a basis for deciding not to regulate emissions.  See Control of Emissions from New 
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003). The Court 
rejected those rationales as outside the scope of the statute and found that “greenhouse gasses fit 
well within [the] capacious definition” of air pollutant. 549 U.S. at 500. For concise yet 
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flexible to accommodate development of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation policy through administrative reform initiatives.9  Why would 
Congress expend the political capital necessary to update the laws if agencies 
can accomplish the same through administrative interpretation and 
implementation of existing laws?  
Leaving matters to agencies, however, raises the two additional concerns:  
What is the scope of agency discretion under existing laws to formulate 
mitigation and adaptation policies, and how aggressively should any such 
authority be exercised?  Appallingly, these two root questions are being 
addressed only through piecemeal interest group litigation and disjointed 
agency policy initiatives.  The time, thus, is ripe for the Obama Administration 
to conduct a systematic, government-wide assessment of the climate change 
policy discretion inherent in existing federal legislation and to develop a 
coordinated plan for exercising it.  
This Article highlights the need for such an initiative and proposes a 
framework for carrying it out.  Part I focuses on the dysfunctional effects 
litigation designed to force agencies into regulating greenhouse gas emissions 
under existing laws, what I call “mitigation litigation,” is likely to have on 
agency policy development.  As strong proponents of mitigation litigation have 
described their agenda, it is simply that “we must launch a thousand arrows 
immediately.”10  And they have been launched.  For example, with over $6 
million of funding already committed, the Center for Biological Diversity 
recently formed the Climate Law Institute to, among other things, “establish 
legal precedents requiring existing environmental laws such as the Clean Air 
Act, Endangered Species Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water 
Act, and the California Environmental Quality Act to be fully implemented to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.”11  Even disregarding the inherently poor 
                                                                                                                 
thorough summaries of the rulemaking petition, the EPA’s decision, lower court proceedings, 
the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions, and the likely impact of the case, see 
Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources – 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10535 (2007); see also Michael 
Sugar, Case Comment, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 531 (2007). 
 9.  See 549 U.S. at 532 (“While the Congresses that drafted [Clean Air Act] might not 
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did 
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific 
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language . . . reflects an 
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.”) 
 10  Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and Boiling:  Endangered Species Act 
Turning Down the Heat, 44 TULSA L. REV. 205, 230 (2008). 
 11. Center for Biological Diversity, Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity 
Announces Climate Law Institute, Dedicates $17 Million to Combat Global Warming (Feb. 12, 
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attributes of litigation for making national policy in general—i.e., that it is not 
transparent, it limits public participation, it is piecemeal, it can lead to 
inconsistent results, it takes a long time to reach conclusion, etc.—mitigation 
litigation is an especially awful platform for developing national climate change 
policy.  Using the Endangered Species Act as a case study, I argue that, while it 
has pushed a few agencies into examining the role of existing authorities, 
mitigation litigation in the long run will lead to an uncoordinated and 
ineffective climate change policy.  Existing legislation, if creatively applied 
within the bounds of permissible agency statutory interpretation, offers many 
opportunities for agencies to pursue mitigation and adaptation policies, but not 
all such opportunities necessarily should be employed to the maximum an 
agency’s policy discretion might allow.  The pursuit of mitigation litigation 
against federal agencies has been designed to push them into emissions 
mitigation regulation “because it’s there,” with no clear vision of how to do so 
at the agency level and no plan for how to coordinate a government-wide 
climate change policy initiative that includes both mitigation and adaptation.  
Targeting agencies with this kind of mitigation litigation forces the federal 
government to build a mitigation policy through ad hoc, agency-by-agency 
litigation.  To be sure, in the George W. Bush Administration, mitigation 
litigation under existing laws moved some agencies off center and in the 
direction of formulating climate change policies.  Indeed, Massachusetts v. 
EPA may in retrospect be seen as the jolt needed to put existing laws in play in 
the climate change policy dialogue.  But continuing down the mitigation 
litigation path will not bring about a coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national 
climate change policy.  
Part II of the Essay suggests a way out of this trap.  I propose federal 
legislation that would suspend for two years all causes of action against 
agencies designed to force them to develop climate change policies under 
existing legislation.  During this period agencies would conduct coordinated 
statutory and policy studies, develop and finalize regulatory proposals, and 
suggest legislative amendments, after which any litigation about the final 
regulations would be channeled through a prescribed judicial review forum.  
Necessary interim agency decisions, such as preparation of environmental 
impact statements and issuance of permits, would to the maximum extent 
practicable and permitted by law be made contingent on the outcome of the rule 
promulgations.  This process would allow agencies to get out from under the 
                                                                                                                 
2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2009/climate-law-institute-02-
12-2009.html.  One of the co-authors of Moritz et al. is the Director of the Center’s Climate 
Law Institute, and another co-author is a staff member of the Center. See Moritz et al., supra 
note 10, at 205 n.n.aa1—aaa1. 
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perverse mitigation litigation cloud while formulating climate change policy in 
a coordinated government-wide process. 
Our nation needs to climb Mount Mitigation, but it also needs to come 
back down intact.  A national climate change policy “map” is desperately 
needed.  It must chart paths for mitigation and adaptation. It must locate new 
and existing authorities at all levels of government.  Existing federal laws will 
play a large role in charting overall mitigation and adaptation objectives, but 
not if we stumble along step-by-step guided by piecemeal, ad hoc mitigation 
litigation.  As important as citizen suit and Administrative Procedure Act 
litigation has been to the development of environmental policy over time, it is 
far too costly, time-consuming, disjointed, and contentious a manner to 
formulate the kind of mitigation policy the nation should expect our 
government to produce in the time frame needed.  Rather, the political stars 
seem aligned such that, if given the chance, federal administrative agencies 
could pull off a coordinated and probing examination of how best to use 
existing authorities toward that end.  My mitigation litigation suspension 
proposal is designed to give them that opportunity  
II. Mitigation Litigation – Pursuing Mitigation Because It’s There 
I define mitigation litigation as any litigation effort designed to force an 
agency to employ, or to not employ, existing regulatory authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions or limit a regulated action on the basis of its 
greenhouse gas emissions.12  As the Climate Law Institute’s mission statement 
suggests, the primary fronts for the initiative have been the Clean Air Act, 
Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental Policy Act.  Thus far, 
however, the first wave of mitigation litigation has produced very little 
mitigation regulation policy.  To be sure, courts have interpreted existing 
statutes to require agencies to integrate climate change into decision making, 
but they have imposed no particular outcome.  For example, the Supreme Court 
in Massachusetts v. EPA pushed the agency toward regulating greenhouse gas 
                                                                                                                 
 12. There is, of course, a much broader range of climate change litigation. A useful 
depiction of the breadth and depth of climate change litigation can be found at a chart lawyers at 
the law firm of Arnold & Porter has prepared. See Michael B. Gerrard and J. Cullen Howe, 
Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., 2009, http://www.climatecasechart.com. The chart 
divides climate change into three primary categories:  statutory claims; common law claims; and 
public international claims. Within the statutory claims category are claims to force the 
government to act, claims to stop government action, and claims to regulate private conduct. My 
mitigation litigation category corresponds most closely to the chart’s claims to force government 
to act category. 
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automobile emissions under the Clean Air Act, but observed that “EPA no 
doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content and coordination 
of its regulations with those of other agencies.”13  Clearly, the Climate Law 
Institute effort is designed to focus the next litigation thrust on shaping the 
policies the EPA and other agencies develop now that they know they cannot so 
easily avoid making decisions about how to address climate change under their 
authorizing statutes. As valuable as the first wave of mitigation litigation was 
for putting existing laws on the climate change policy playing board, however, 
the launching of the second wave portends only folly. 
Nowhere is the potential fallout from this single-minded litigation-led 
quest for the mitigation peak more evident than in the debate over how to 
integrate the Endangered Species Act (ESA) into climate change policy.  I 
previously have outlined the scope of discretion agencies have under the 
existing ESA to engage in climate change mitigation and adaptation 
measures.14  Like the Clean Air Act and most other existing environmental 
laws, the ESA does not mention climate change but is riddled with provisions 
that offer varying ranges of discretion to agencies to formulate climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies, making it a sitting duck for mitigation 
litigation. In particular, Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides: 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of 
the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
such agency (…“action agency”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined . . . to be critical . . . .15 
The statute and implementing regulations build an elaborate procedure for 
carrying out these consultations under which the agency proposing the action 
(known as the “action agency”) must consult with, depending on the species, 
either the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) through a series of steps designed to predict the impact of the 
action on listed species, with the ultimate product being a “biological opinion” 
from the FWS or NMFS “setting forth the [agency’s] opinion, and a summary 
                                                                                                                 
 13. 549 U.S. at 533. 
 14. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:  Building Bridges to 
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 15. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).  The provision also requires that “[i]n fulfilling the 
requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data 
available.”  Id.   
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of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency 
action affects the species or its critical habitat.”16  
The substantive content for conducting the consultation analysis is defined 
primarily in joint FWS/NMFS regulations.  “Jeopardize” is defined there as “to 
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to 
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of 
that species.”17  “Action” is defined as “all activities or programs of any kind 
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in 
the United States or upon the high seas.”18  “Effects of the action” include “the 
direct and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together 
with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with 
that action, that will be added to the environmental baseline.”19  The “indirect 
effects” are “those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, 
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”20 
On the one hand, greenhouse gas emissions and their climate change 
consequences arguably can be plausibly fit into this framework.  Greenhouse 
gas emissions from actions carried out, funded, or authorized by federal 
agencies contribute to tropospheric warming, the indirect effects of which could 
at some later time adversely affect a protected species.  Although determining 
whether these effects actually occur may be difficult to do reliably in particular 
scenarios, the point is that they could occur.  
On the other hand, there are considerable legal, scientific, and practical 
difficulties with fitting climate change into the consultation framework at the 
level of detail necessary to evaluate particular federal agency actions, even 
relatively large or programmatic actions.  Consider, for example, a proposed 
coal-fired power plant in Florida and its effects on the polar bear in the Arctic.  
The argument for applying the ESA goes as follows:  the power plant emits 
greenhouse gases (a direct effect of the action), greenhouse gases are 
reasonably certain to warm the troposphere (an indirect effect of the action), a 
warming troposphere is reasonably certain to adversely alter ecological 
conditions for the polar bear, and it is reasonably expected that such ecological 
changes will bring an end to the polar bear as a species.   
                                                                                                                 
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
 17. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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While that chain of events makes for an easy connect-the-dots story, in 
fact any effort to link the individual plant’s emissions as the jeopardizing agent 
for the polar bear species would meet obvious objections stemming from the 
fact that all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide are subject to the same causal 
analysis.  Acting through an incredibly complex temporal and spatial causal 
chain beginning over a century ago, all greenhouse gas molecules are equally to 
blame for whatever impact climate change has on a species.  It is not possible, 
therefore, to “upscale” current emissions from a particular source and 
“downscale” them in real time to a particular impact on the ground, which is 
precisely what the Section 7 consultation process would require the FWS and 
NMFS to do for every action funded, carried out, or authorized by federal 
agencies.21  As a federal court recently explained in deciding the causation 
requirement of Article III standing had not been met in a claim that current 
greenhouse gas emissions are causing a public nuisance: 
The undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas emissions from all global 
sources and their worldwide accumulation over long periods of time . . . 
makes clear that there is no realistic probability of tracing any particular 
alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific 
person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time . . . .  [T]he genesis 
of global warming is attributable to numerous entities which individually 
and cumulatively over the span of centuries created the effects . . . .  [I]t Is 
not plausible to state which emissions—emitted by whom and at what time 
in the last several centuries and at what place in the world—“caused . . . 
alleged global warming related injuries.22  
                                                                                                                 
 21. Moritz et al. argue that “[j]ust as there is no requirement to link the thinning of any 
particular bald eagle egg to any particular molecule of DDT to demonstrate that authorization of 
the use of DDT may result in a taking of bald eagles, there is no requirement to link any 
particular molecule of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse pollutant to the death of an individual 
bear.” Moritz et al, supra note 10, at 226. The difference, of course, is that DDT is ingested by 
and toxic to bald eagles, whereas carbon dioxide is not the lethal agent in the case of the polar 
bear. A complex spatially and temporally attenuated causal chain involving the planet’s vast 
physical system exists between the emission of a molecule of a greenhouse gas and its climate 
change effect on a polar bear. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE CHALLENGES OF 
LINKING CARBON EMISSIONS, ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, 
GLOBAL WARMING, AND CONSEQUENTIAL IMPACTS, (2008), 
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2008/ polarbear012308/pdf/Memo_to_FWS-
Polar_Bears.PDF. 
 22. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, No. C 08-1138 SBA, slip op. at 13 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). The Fifth Circuit recently criticized this reasoning as improperly 
conflating the merits of the nuisance claim with the causation requirement of standing, in that 
the standing requirement “need not be as close as the proximate causation needed to succeed on 
the merits of a tort claim.” Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756, slip op. at 5 (5th Cir. Oct. 
16, 2009). No court has yet reached the merits of such a claim.    
CLIMBING MOUNT MITIGATION 81 
Every source of greenhouse gas emissions funded, carried out, or 
authorized by a federal agency, therefore, is on the same footing with respect to 
causation of jeopardy for a climate-threatened species.  In other words, going 
down the mitigation road with Section 7 would subject a vast segment of our 
nation’s economy to greenhouse gas regulation under the ESA, with no 
principled way of distinguishing between emission sources for purposes of 
assigning “jeopardizing” causal status.  Either all federal actions would trigger 
jeopardy status and be subject to regulation by the FWS and NMFS,23 or the 
FWS and NMFS would have to adopt arbitrary thresholds for assigning 
jeopardy status (e.g., quantity or efficiency of emissions) that would face 
difficult legal challenges. 
Indeed, the suggestion that Section 7 could, in Clean Air Act like fashion, 
arbitrarily apply only to “major” greenhouse gas emission sources but lay off 
the small ones fundamentally misses the basic theme of the jeopardy 
prohibition.  Moritz et al. argue, for example, that the FWS and NMFS “could 
set a threshold level for consultation, as long as it was reasonable and 
sufficiently protective of listed species.”24  But they do not point to authority in 
Section 7 or elsewhere in the ESA for differentiating between sources in terms 
of legal status if there is no scientific basis for differentiating the sources’ 
causal status.  The regulatory definition of jeopardy, they point out, is “to 
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species in the wild,”25 which they suggest opens the door to an emissions level 
threshold.  But consider how “appreciably” would be measured once a species 
is in jeopardy of not surviving and recovering.  Jeopardy itself can be thought 
of as a threshold the ESA prohibits federal agencies from crossing based on the 
status of the species in question.  After a species is listed, it is not the case that 
no further degradation of the species’ condition or its habitat is permitted.  
Rather, the “incidental take authorization” procedures of Sections 7 and 10 
allow public and private actions to cause harm and even death to individuals of 
the species with FWS and NMFS approval, with the jeopardy prohibition of 
Section 7 acting as a threshold of maximum tolerance.26  Hence, in reality there 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Regulation by the FWS and NMFS comes in the form of the agencies specifying 
“reasonable and prudent” alternatives to the action as proposed. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
Presumably, in the climate change mitigation context this would mean placing caps on emission 
levels. Proponents of this use of the ESA have yet to explain how the FWS and NMFS would 
establish such caps for different sources. 
 24. Moritz et al., supra note 10, at 228.  
 25. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added). 
 26. Section 9 of the ESA requires that all persons, including all private and public entities 
subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of fish and wildlife.16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).  For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for what 
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is an increment of “likelihood of survival and recovery” that additional federal 
and nonfederal actions erode through these incidental take authorizations.  At 
some point, that increment is sufficiently eroded that the next action requiring 
incidental take authorization would trigger a jeopardy finding regardless of its 
“size.”  In the polar bear’s case, in other words, conditions could reach the 
point that the species can tolerate no additional net increase in emissions of 
greenhouse gases without moving the likelihood of survival and recovery 
dangerously close to zero.  At that point, if we want to entertain this causal 
story at the micro scale of discrete land uses, zero additional emissions of 
greenhouse gases from any source could escape a jeopardy finding.  
Moreover, the idea that the ESA can differentiate between “major” and 
“minor” sources, regulating the former and leaving the latter outside the scope 
of consultation, turns the “cumulative effects” problem on its head in violation 
of Section 7.  If Moritz et al. believe establishing causation is not a problem for 
applying Section 7 to emissions from “major” sources, then it follows that it 
also is not a problem for applying Section 7 to the cumulative effects of 
“minor” sources.  Rarely does one hear environmental protection interest 
groups lobby in favor of an exemption from Section 7 for projects destroying 
under 20 acres of forest habitat of an endangered bird, or for projects diverting 
under 10 acre feet of water for an endangered fish, or for projects releasing 
under 10 pounds of pesticides for an endangered reptile.  I wouldn’t either.  
Why, then, would anyone be comfortable regulating only “major” sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions under the ESA, other than as an expedient to regulate 
major sources of greenhouse gas emissions and avoid the political and legal 
complications of regulating all causal sources? Why would greenhouse gas 
emissions from, say, hundreds of thousands of farms receiving federal subsidies 
not cross the jeopardy threshold but emissions from a single large power plant 
would?  
Moritz et al. overlook that Section 7 regulations specifically prohibit this 
distortion by requiring that cumulative impacts be considered.  The precise 
question under review in a Section 7 consultation is whether “the action, taken 
                                                                                                                 
constitutes “take,” see Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species:  Difficult Questions 
of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001) Steven P. Quarles & Thomas 
R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and 
the “Harm” Regulation?, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:  LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 207 
(Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002). Sections 7 (for federal agency actions) and 10 
(for actions not subject to Section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for FWS to approve 
“incidental take” of listed species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) and  1539(a)(1). “Incidental take,” 
although not explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is described in section 10 of the 
statute as take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise 
lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).    
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together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence 
of listed species.”27  Cumulative effects are “those effects of future State or 
private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to 
occur within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation,”28 and 
the action area includes “all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the 
Federal action and not just the immediate area involved in the action.”29  This 
means that for greenhouse gas emission sources, if Section 7 is applied to them, 
the action area is the entire planet and thus all greenhouse emissions from all 
sources subject to United States jurisdiction anywhere in the world would have 
to be included in the cumulative effects component of the consultation.30  
Rather obviously, no source, no matter how small, could escape a jeopardy 
finding under this causal reasoning once the cumulative effects sources are 
factored into the consultation.  In short, there is no way under Section 7 to have 
your cake and eat it too; if one believes greenhouse gas emissions can be 
regulated under Section 7 notwithstanding the tenuous causal theory supporting 
that view, every source of greenhouse gas emissions the federal government 
carries out, funds, or authorizes will, because of how cumulative effects and the 
action area are defined, be found to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both 
the survival and recovery of all climate-threatened listed species in the world.    
My suggestion that this application of Section 7 is not a practical use of 
the ESA and should be avoided to the extent permitted under the agencies’ 
discretion has been met with accusations that I am “rationaliz[ing] for a 
preferred policy approach rather than a meritorious legal argument.”31  This 
critique seems out of place with the recognition, endorsed by a long list of 
environmental law professors, that “there is a legitimate debate to be had over 
how well the current structure of the ESA serves to address climate change in 
general, or climate change impacts on listed species in particular,” and that “it 
is unclear whether consultation would halt…power plants, require significant 
changes to the projects, or have no impact at all.”32  Other legal commentary 
recognizes the difficulties of establishing the necessary causation under the 
ESA and suggests that either my or the Moritz et al. perspective finds plausible 
                                                                                                                 
 27. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). A consultation thus must “evaluate the effects of the action 
and cumulative effects on the listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3). Id. § 402.02.  
 28. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
 29. Id.   
 30. The ESA applies broadly to all federal, state, local, tribal, and private entities, 
including individuals, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). 
 31. Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 227. 
 32. Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conversation:  Amended ESA Section 7 
Regulations Put Species At Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139, 147 (2009) 
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support in ESA law.33  Proponents of using the ESA as the lynchpin of our 
nation’s greenhouse gas regulation regime thus seem no less susceptible to the 
charge of preferring a policy outcome than am I.  Moritz et al. suggest, for 
example, that “[o]nly by fully implementing the ESA to help avoid rapid and 
catastrophic climate change can we keep it the strongest and most relevant 
biodiversity protection statute that the world has ever seen,”34 and that “[t]here 
is absolutely no reason why we should not require these agencies to adopt all 
feasible measures to reduce emissions immediately through the Section 7 
process,”35 but that is just their “preferred policy approach.”   
I make no bones about my “preferred policy approach;”it is to promote the 
ESA as one of the nation’s focused climate change adaptation statutes, for 
which I argue the ESA is especially well designed, and leave greenhouse gas 
emission regulation to agencies that are better equipped at pollution control 
science and technology, such as the EPA.36  The question boils down to 
whether my “preferred policy approach” fits within the range of discretion the 
FWS and the NMFS enjoy under Section 7; that is, whether courts would find 
the agencies’ position that causation cannot be established within the meaning 
of Section 7 is a reasonable interpretation of the statute entitled to judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR BEAR 
LISTING TO FORCE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:  THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 3–5 
(2008) (laying out the legal basis for both positions); Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the 
Endangered Species Act:  The Difficulty of Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 171–82 
(2009) (detailing the causation obstacles to using section 7 to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions). But see Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull Off the Leash:  Siccing the 
Endangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 303–04, 307–08 
(2009) (arguing in the extreme that there is no significant obstacle to proving causation in a 
claim that greenhouse gas emissions cause take of an identifiable member of a species in 
violation of section 9). 
 34. Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 230. 
 35.  Id. at 225. 
 36.  Finding the “assertion that scientists and managers within the Services do not have the 
expertise to analyze greenhouse gas emission in section 7 consultations particularly puzzling,” 
Moritz et al. presumably believe that the FWS and NMFS either already have or should be 
empowered with the pollution modeling and control technology design expertise needed to 
regulate the nation’s sources of greenhouse gas pollutants. Id. at 227. While I agree that, with 
sufficient time and funding, the FWS and the NMFS could duplicate EPA’s pollution regulation 
expertise, I am suggesting that it makes no practical sense to do so as a means of engaging the 
ESA in the nation’s climate change policy strategy when so much more can be done using the 
agencies’ existing capacities toward assisting species in adapting to climate change. In any 
event, the fact of the matter is that, at present, neither the FWS nor the NMFS purports to have 
or exercise the expertise needed to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the industrial and 
agricultural complex of the entire United States, which is what going down the path Moritz et al. 
propose would require.  
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deference. I believe a “meritorious legal argument” can be made that they 
would.  
To be sure, under my approach the FWS and NMFS would have no room 
to dodge the ESA’s mandate at least to consider the effects of climate change 
on actions and species as part of the environmental baseline required to be 
accounted for in all consultations under Section 7.37  That is, after all, a 
necessary ingredient of using the ESA to assist species adaptation.  The 
mitigation litigation cause wants much more, however, and the reaction by the 
Bush Administration was to launch a counter-offensive that sent the question of 
the ESA and climate policy spiraling out of control.  
The pushback began in full force in May 2008, when the FWS 
promulgated a final rule listing the polar bear as threatened based on factors 
that included the impacts of climate change on Arctic sea ice.38  Secretary of the 
Interior Dirk Kempthorne stressed at the time that the listing would not provide 
a basis for using the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
sources.39  The FWS also issued interim and final section 4(d) rules for the 
polar bear, exempting from section 9 take prohibitions any activity already 
exempt or authorized under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and, for any 
activity outside of Alaska, also exempting all takes incidental to a lawful 
purpose.40 The unspoken purpose of the latter approach undoubtedly was to cut 
off claims that GHG emissions sources outside of Alaska are causing 
unauthorized take of the polar bear.  In tandem with that, the Department of the 
Interior also issued a memorandum explaining it will not consider GHG 
emissions in consultations about the polar bear or other species listed due to 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 368-70 (E.D. Cal. 
2007) (The FWS must consider the effects of climate change on actions regulated under the 
ESA). The environmental baseline in section 7 consultations refers to “the past and present 
impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the 
anticipated impacts of all proposed federal projects in the action area that have already 
undergone…consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous 
with the consultation in process.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. It is against this baseline that the 
action under review is evaluated to determine its incremental effect. The impacts of climate 
change attributable to those other actions, therefore, should be included in that baseline. The 
baseline analysis operates at a macro level—i.e., all that matters is that the baseline takes climate 
change impacts into account, not that it assign responsibility to specific sources.  
 38. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28212 (May 15, 2008). 
 39. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to 
Protect Polar Bears under Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008). 
 40. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28306 (May 15, 2008) (interim rule); 73 Fed. Reg. 76249 (Dec. 16, 
2008) (final rule). 
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climate threats because tracing causation is, according to the highly respected 
United States Geological Survey, scientifically impossible.41   
The FWS and NMFS later followed up on that position by promulgating 
new section 7(a)(2) consultation regulations designed to, among other things, 
preclude consideration of greenhouse emissions in consultations.  Culminating 
one of the most controversial rulemakings in the history of ESA 
implementation, in December 2008, the FWS and NMFS promulgated final 
rules revising various features of the Section 7 consultation regulations.  The 
changes, too extensive to cover and assess in detail here, fell into three 
categories:  (1) revised and new definitions for the causation and effects 
analyses; (2) revisions to applicability designed to preclude consideration of 
GHG emissions in consultations; and (3) streamlined consultations through a 
shift in decision authority to action agencies. Some of the changes merely 
codified existing conditions, such as a new provision limiting consultations to 
discretionary actions. But some had the potential to radically alter consultation 
practice. Some significant changes included:  indirect effects are limited to 
those effects that occur later in time for which the proposed action is an 
“essential cause;”42if an effect will occur whether or not the proposed action 
takes place, it is not an indirect effect.;43 indirect effects must be reasonably 
likely to occur based on “clear and substantial information;”44for actions not 
anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the effects are 
manifested through “global processes” that cannot be reliably predicted or 
measured, have an insignificant impact, or pose only a remote risk;45for actions 
not anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the effects are not 
capable of being measured in a way that permits “meaningful evaluation;”46 and 
action agencies will determine for themselves whether, under these new 
standards, formal consultation is necessary. 
The rule attracted considerable controversy:  tens of thousands of 
comments were filed on the proposed rule, and litigation was filed immediately 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Solicitor’s Opinion, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Guidance 
on the Applicability of the Endangered Species Act’s Consultation Requirements to Proposed 
Actions Involving the Emission of Greenhouse Gases (Oct. 3, 2008); Memorandum from the 
Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, The Challenges of Linking Carbon 
Emissions, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Global Warming, and Consequential 
Impacts (May 14, 2008). The Department in the Obama Administration has not rescinded that 
guidance.  
 42. 73 Fed. Reg. 76249, 76287 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. § 402.03(b)(2). 
 46. Id. § 402.03(b)(3)(i). 
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to challenge the final rule. Many environmental strategists outlined ways the 
Obama Administration could, through executive action or in concert with 
Congress, swiftly nullify the rule.  In March 2009 President Obama ordered 
FWS and NMFS to review the rules and authorized other federal agencies “to 
follow the prior longstanding consultation and concurrence practices.”47  Soon 
thereafter Congress passed legislation allowing the agencies to withdraw the 
polar bear section 4(d) rule and the consultation rule with no notice and 
comment procedures,48 which the agencies did for the consultation rule 
effective May 4, 2009.49  Other than raise a fuss about the Bush Administration 
consultation rule, however, neither Congress nor the Obama Administration has 
shown any interest in dragging the ESA into the war on greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Nothing in the legislation allowing the agencies to overturn the 
rules or in the agencies’ statement accompanying the decision to overturn the 
consultation rule so much as mentions using the ESA to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Indeed, all indications thus far suggest that interest groups 
pursuing mitigation litigation under the ESA will not like the Obama 
Administration's position much more than they did the Bush Administration's:  
Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior David Hayes told senators 
during his confirmation hearing that the endangered species law is ill-suited for 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions; Tom Strickland, the Assistant Secretary 
for Fish, Wildlife and Parks overseeing the ESA, said the same at his hearing; 
and, more directly to the point, FWS spokesman Josh Winchell said in 
February 2009 that “we have zero legislative authority to regulate carbon 
emissions.  That is just not what we do.  With the polar bear, the science 
definitely pointed to climate change, but that does not all of a sudden give us 
the authority to address the underlying cause, which is carbon emissions.”50  
Putting those words into action, on May 8, 2009, Interior Secretary Salazar 
announced the agency’s decision not to rescind the polar section bear section 
4(d) rule, proclaiming that “the Endangered Species Act is not the proper 
mechanism for controlling our nation’s carbon emissions.”51 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies Re:  The Endangered Species Act (Mar. 3, 2009). 
 48. 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. E, tit. IV, § 429, 123 Stat. 
544, 749. 
 49. See 74 Fed. Reg. 20421 (May 4, 2009) 
 50. Greenwire, Endangered Species:  Some See EPA’s Climate Proposal Prodding 
Interior on ESA (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/ 
print/2009/04/23/4; see also Alan Kovski, Interior Nominee Agrees Climate Change Fits Poorly 
in Endangered Species Rules, 40 Env’t Rep. (Bureau of National Affairs, Arlington, VA) 605, 
622 (Mar. 20, 2009).  
 51. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, News Release, Salazar Retains Conservation Rule for 
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The point of recounting this history and the complexities of applying the 
ESA to greenhouse gas emissions is that there has to be a better way of going 
about integrating existing laws into a national climate change policy than 
having interest groups and federal agencies flail about in piecemeal litigation 
and defensive rulemakings.  Federal agencies must act, but they ought to be 
able to act at least initially without the specter of mitigation litigation looming.  
A coordinated, multi-scalar national climate change policy is too important to 
have in place, and soon, to allow it to be forged by courts interpreting existing 
laws through ad hoc litigation around the nation.  In the next section, I propose 
a legislative suspension of mitigation litigation to facilitate development of such 
a policy. 
III. Designing a Systematic Climate Change Policy Development Process 
President Obama’s appointment of Carol Browner as White House 
Coordinator of Energy and Climate Policy is an important first step in forging a 
coordinated national climate change policy, but neither President Obama nor 
Ms. Browner can do much to stem mitigation litigation while she works toward 
that end.  Congress must step in for that part.  As unlikely as it is that Congress 
would choose to offend the lawyers and interest groups pursuing mitigation 
litigation or to appear to be limiting public participation, the following proposal 
outlines what I believe is a sensible approach to suspending mitigation 
litigation while federal agencies are required to develop coordinated 
rulemakings for activating existing laws to contribute to climate change 
mitigation and litigation. 
A. Suspending Climate Change Litigation Causes of Action 
Step one of my proposal is for Congress and President Obama to enact 
legislation suspending mitigation litigation for two years.  This can be 
accomplished one of two ways.  One is to enact an omnibus provision 
preventing any new or continued litigation using citizen suit or Administrative 
Procedure Act causes of action to pursue mitigation litigation claims, that is  to 
force any federal agency to regulate or not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
or to develop or revise policies with respect to whether and how to regulate 
                                                                                                                 
Polar Bears, Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate Legislation (May 8, 
2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/ 
showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E0892D91701. 
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greenhouse gas emissions. A more aggressive approach would be, in addition, 
to suspend federal judicial jurisdiction over all such claims and remedies, so as 
to prevent other types of litigation (e.g., common law claims) from somehow 
leading to judicial orders violating the intent of the suspension.  Alternatively, 
or in tandem, the legislation could direct federal agencies not to develop or 
revise climate change policies until they have completed the policy 
development process outlined below. 
B. Defining Climate Change Statutory Discretion Under Existing Laws 
At the commencement of the suspension period, every federal agency 
would have six months to produce for Congress and the President a report (a) 
examining all potential authorities in existing laws it administers that could 
support climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and the extent of 
discretion available to the agency under each provision, (b) detailing the 
agency’s decisions about how to exercise those authorities within its range of 
discretion, (c) developing, through an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, 
draft regulations for implementing the agency’s vision, and (d) recommending 
statutory amendments where necessary to provide more definitive or necessary 
support for policies the agency believes should be pursued but for which 
existing law does not provide authority. 
C. Coordinated Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Rule 
Promulgation 
In the next six months of the suspension period, a task force appointed 
pursuant to the terms of the legislation (e.g., relevant Department and agency 
heads) and chaired by the White House Coordinator will use the reports 
compiled by each agency and comments on the advanced notices of 
rulemakings to develop a coordinated national policy for existing laws and will 
evaluate each agency’s draft regulations to recommend any changes necessary 
to allow the agency most usefully to contribute to the policy. During the second 
year of the suspension period each agency then will propose regulations and 
complete promulgation by the end of the two-year suspension period using 
standard APA rule promulgation procedures.  During the second year the task 
force will also evaluate the statutory amendment recommendations of each 
agency and report on them to Congress, and it will also outline policies for 
integrating state, local, and tribal policy initiatives. 
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D. Interim Decisions 
During the suspension period, agencies of course will need to implement 
existing laws, such as by issuing or denying permits, preparing environmental 
impact statements, and carrying out, funding, and authorizing other actions.  To 
the extent permissible by law, all such actions will be contingent on the rules 
adopted from the process, with provisions made for modification of permits, 
funding conditions, and project design to bring all actions into compliance with 
the new regulations as soon as practical.  Federal agencies and non-federal 
actors receiving federal funding or authorization may during this interim period 
design actions to be consistent with what the federal agency believes is likely to 
comply with its regulations.  For any project that cannot legally include this 
contingency and which is not voluntarily designed to anticipate compliance 
requirements, the duration or magnitude of the agency action (e,g., the permit 
period or funding level) will be the lowest allowed by applicable law so as to 
ensure that the new rules, once in effect, can be applied to the next 
discretionary decision whether to renew or revise the action. 
E. Judicial Review 
To ensure uniformity of judicial treatment of the rules produced from the 
process and all decisions made during the suspension period that trigger the 
interim contingency condition, judicial review of all rules promulgated through 
the process and any claims collaterally challenging the new rules (e.g., a permit 
challenge contesting the scope of the new rules) will be conducted directly in 
the D.C. Circuit.  The review standard for agency interpretations of the existing 
statutory authorities on which the new rules are based will require the court to 
apply the Chevron standard in all cases. 
IV. Conclusion 
I agree with the perspective that climate change requires that we will likely 
need to “launch a thousand arrows,” but I do not agree that we must or should 
do so “immediately.”  Better, I believe, to take aim first, pull on the bow with 
deliberation, and hit the target.  To use another metaphor, better to draw up a 
good map before climbing up Mount Mitigation.  Yet the unchecked 
continuation of mitigation litigation involves using no map at all.  It was by all 
accounts necessary to engage in mitigation litigation to push the Bush 
Administration into acknowledging the need to integrate existing laws into 
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climate change policy, but the operating assumption ought to be that this 
catalyst function is no longer necessary in the Obama Administration working 
in unison with Congress in its current political composition.  Yet this is not 
necessarily an unlimited window either politically or physically—action is 
needed, and it is time to force agencies to act. But that force ought not come by 
way of ad hoc litigation.  Rather, Congress and President Obama should take 
the bull by the horns by stopping mitigation litigation and requiring federal 
agencies to get their heads out of the sand.  One measure without the other will 
produce a far less coherent national climate change policy, but putting both in 
place will allow us to climb Mount Mitigation with a map to get us up and back 
down with a purpose, not just because it’s there. 
